The Taliban Wants the US Back. What Do Afghans Want?

Five years after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan and the U.S. withdrew its troops, the group is now asking for something that once seemed almost unthinkable: the diplomatic and economic return of the United States.

In August, Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi called on Washington to reopen its embassy in Kabul, maintain a diplomatic presence and invest in Afghanistan, including in its mines, infrastructure and other economic sectors. He argued that the period of intervention was over and that future relations should be based on mutual respect.

After two decades of war, the U.S closed its embassy in Kabul on Aug. 31, 2021 following military withdrawal. Diplomatic operations for U.S. citizens in Afghanistan then moved to Doha, Qatar.

Muttaqi’s appeal comes as the Taliban continues its effort to break Afghanistan’s international isolation. Russia formally recognized the Taliban government in July 2025, while India has upgraded its diplomatic presence in Kabul to a full embassy. The Taliban held talks with China, Iran and Pakistan last year. The European Union has also been talking with Afghanistan this year about diplomatic services and “dignified returns” or deportations of Afghans.

The idea of renewed U.S.-Afghan relations is also being raised in Washington. Rep. Aisha Wahab, the first Afghan-American elected to Congress, has called for the United States to pursue diplomacy with Afghanistan regardless of which group is in power. She described the situation in Afghanistan as “hopeless,” and looked to formal relations between the two countries as a way to help improve conditions for Afghan girls and women.

But it is important to ask what Afghans themselves want. 

For many, the debate is not simply about whether the U.S. should return to Kabul, or whether the Taliban deserves international recognition. It is about what any new relationship would mean for people living under Taliban rule — and whether engagement would improve their lives or simply strengthen the authorities who control them.

For women who have been pushed out of schools and workplaces, diplomatic normalization, rather than an opportunity for them, could be another international concession to the Taliban.

An Afghan female doctor in Nangarhar, Arzo Asad — her real name withheld for her safety —  said establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S. under the current circumstances would be “very negative and shameful.”

She worries it could signal to the Taliban that it can maintain its restrictions without paying an international price.

In March 2022, the education ministry formally suspended girls’ education above sixth grade; on Dec. 20, 2022, the Ministry of Higher Education suspended women from attending university, and that same month, the Taliban barred women from working for national and international nongovernmental organizations. Finally, on Dec. 2, 2024, women were barred from attending medical and semi-professional institutes.

“If the U.S. starts relations with the Taliban while women are banned from education and work, it could encourage the Taliban to continue these policies,” Asad told Truthdig.

She said first the Taliban should listen to Afghan women and remove the restrictions before then seeking stronger international relations.

Her concern goes beyond the symbolism of a U.S. embassy reopening in Kabul to the question of who gets to define what normalization means. For women who have spent years watching doors close, the return of diplomats cannot automatically be understood as progress.

Jamila Sadat, a Kabul teacher whose name has also been changed for her safety, told Truthdig that she has been unemployed for five years. 

“The Taliban closed girls’ schools, took my job and closed the doors of education for Afghan girls,” Sadat said.

Reestablishing relations with the U.S. while women face such restrictions would be “very shameful,” she said, while agreeing with Asad that the Taliban should first seek legitimacy from Afghans before seeking international recognition.

That distinction — between international engagement and domestic legitimacy — sits at the heart of Afghanistan’s current dilemma.

While the Taliban controls the state apparatus, such control is not the same as political legitimacy and support. Since returning to power, the Taliban has governed without national elections or an elected legislature, and has directly appointed senior officials. The United Nations has also raised concerns about the lack of inclusive governance, noting that the de facto authorities are entirely male and largely drawn from the Taliban leadership and rural political base. 

Economic price of isolation

Obaidullah Baheer, an Afghanistan-based lecturer in transitional justice at the American University of Afghanistan, says however that a lack of international relations with the authorities in Kabul doesn’t directly address rights and freedoms, and can also have negative consequences for ordinary Afghans.

Baheer told Truthdig that the Taliban has never completely disengaged from the United States, pointing to security cooperation around mutual threats. In 2022, U.S. special representative for Afghanistan Thomas West met with the Taliban in Doha to discuss various U.S. interests, including counterterrorism.

Baheer said the U.S. has not had a clear long-term strategy for Afghanistan, but the Taliban’s invitation for U.S. investment in Afghanistan’s minerals and infrastructure could provide an opening for broader diplomatic engagement.

“Regardless of the political structure, people should decide the fate of their country,” Baheer said, stressing the importance of supporting and listening to Afghan civil society groups.

Isolation isn’t only affecting the Taliban government. He said the consequent economic hardship is reducing ordinary Afghans’ ability to advocate for political and social rights.

Food supply constraints caused by the isolation, as well as other factors like drought and climate change, have led to higher food prices and increased inflation (7.6% in March this year). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, an estimated 13.8 million Afghans are facing acute food insecurity caused by these economic difficulties and reduced humanitarian assistance, as well as high unemployment.

The U.S. ended its humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan in April 2025, and in 2021, froze US$9.5 billion in Afghan central bank assets.

“They’re trying to starve the Afghan family in order to save the Afghan woman,” Baheer said, referring to the U.S. and other Western countries.

He argued that international policy should not separate economic pressure on Afghanistan from the impact on Afghans. Similarly, international relations with Afghanistan wouldn’t automatically imply unconditional support for the Taliban.

The U.S. has a particular responsibility toward Afghanistan because of its role in the country’s affairs during the Cold War and its two decades of military intervention, Baheer said. He argued that any aid or economic support from the U.S., rather than a kindness, would be a form of responsibility toward a country that was left heavily dependent on foreign aid after the war.

The 20-year U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan killed an estimated 243,000 people there, and by August 2021, at least 5.9 million Afghans had fled the country or were internally displaced. Brown University researchers also found that poverty, food insecurity and child malnutrition were much higher in Afghanistan after the war than before the 2001 U.S. invasion.

Baheer warned that this is why a close relationship with Washington could be risky for Afghanistan.

“Being enemies with the United States is bad but being friends with it is lethal,” he said, arguing that any relationship Afghanistan has with Washington should be based on mutual benefit rather than dependence.

End isolation without supporting the Taliban

“There is no doubt that the Taliban wants recognition, especially from the United States,” Shahmahmood Miakhel, a former governor of Nangarhar province (2019-2020) and former senior Afghan republican government official (2003-2005 and 2020 to March 2021) — now living in the U.S., told Truthdig. He explained that recognition by Washington could influence the willingness of other governments to deepen their own relations with Kabul.

To achieve that, the Taliban has tried to separate its domestic policies from the international consequences of those policies, he said, adding that for the Taliban, issues such as women’s rights, political representation, freedom of expression and the country’s political system are internal matters, and shouldn’t impact international recognition and support.

He believes, however, that recognizing the Taliban as it currently operates, would be harmful, but he also doesn’t see ongoing isolation as a solution.

“Talks are necessary,” Miakhel said, but stressed they don’t have to automatically imply recognition.

What Afghanistan needs is an intra-Afghan political process in which various Afghan groups and communities can participate in determining the country’s political future, he said, arguing that inclusive dialogue could eventually lead to a Loya Jirga, or grand assembly, where Afghans could discuss a political roadmap for the country.

These assemblies are based on an Afghan tradition of bringing together representatives from different parts of society to discuss major national questions. The most recent broadly recognized national Loya Jirga was the Consultative Peace Loya Jirga held in Kabul from April 29 to May 3, 2019. More than 3,200 delegates took part, including politicians, religious scholars, tribal and community elders, women, civil society representatives, academics, youth, members of the private sector and representatives of Afghans living abroad. The gathering discussed the framework for peace negotiations with the Taliban and called for the protection of rights. 

A similar gathering was held in August 2020 to discuss the release of Taliban prisoners, which affected the peace talks. The Taliban also held a large gathering in 2022, but it primarily involved religious leaders who supported the Taliban and excluded women.

The kind of Loya Jirga Miakhel is proposing would be closer to the broader national assemblies held prior to the Taliban’s return to power. He believes representatives from across Afghan society would need to participate in a process that could discuss the country’s political future and a roadmap toward a more broadly accepted system of government. 

At the same time, he also identified ethnic, regional and political divisions among Afghans as an obstacle that has hindered organized opposition to the Taliban. 

There is no single organized political or armed bloc opposing Taliban rule. The National Resistance Front and Afghanistan Freedom Front are the main armed resistance groups, alongside several smaller organizations. The NRF is predominantly Tajik, while the other opposition groups have emerged from different political and regional backgrounds.

At the same time, the space for political organization inside Afghanistan has narrowed sharply. The Taliban has outlawed political parties, while many opponents have left the country, gone into hiding or resorted to self-censorship.

A Loya Jirga however could be a step towards a broadly accepted political authority capable of representing all Afghans internationally, Miakhel said.

Competing expectations

In Kabul, debate around U.S. engagement reflects three quite different expectations, Said Omar Sahar, a journalist working in the capital, told Truthdig.

“First, that if the U.S. returns to Afghanistan, low-level or hardline Taliban factions might oppose the move, break away from the main Taliban and government structures, and launch an armed struggle against the Americans within the country,” he said.

“Second, the U.S. presence could spur investment and create employment opportunities for the population. And third, a U.S. return could jeopardize the current interests of China and Russia in Afghanistan, potentially transforming the country once again into a theater of conflict and rivalry among two or three major powers.” 

Sahar’s own message to the U.S. “would be to unfreeze the assets” he said, referring to the Afghan central bank assets that are still frozen, as well to sanctions by the U.N. on the Taliban and, separately, on al-Qaida and Daesh, which consist of asset freezes, travel bans and an arms embargo. The EU, UK, and U.S. have incorporated the U.N. sanctions.

Given that the U.S. fought the Taliban for so many years, Sahar said Afghans are right to ask why the Taliban is now seeking closer relations with Washington.

At the same time, Sahar said relations should not come without pressure on the Taliban over its domestic policies. The U.S. should use diplomacy to push for girls’ education, women’s employment and freedom of expression, he argued.

However, any such engagement would be overshadowed by the United States’ own contested human-rights record. Amnesty International has documented serious concerns over U.S. policies, including restrictions on migrants and asylum seekers, violations of protesters’ rights, the use of lethal force, arbitrary detention and killing civilians in Iran. It also criticized continued U.S. arms transfers to Israel, saying U.S.-supplied weapons have been used in attacks on Palestinian civilians.

The different positions expressed by Afghans interviewed by Truthdig reflect competing concerns about what renewed international engagement could mean. For some, it offers a path out of isolation. For women shut out of classrooms and workplaces, the risk is that normalization arrives before their rights do.