Turkey’s Autocratic Descent Serves as a Warning for the U.S.

The arrest of Istanbul’s mayor and the opposition’s leading contender for the 2028 elections, Ekrem İmamoğlu, marks a new threshold in Turkey’s descent into full autocracy. 

Although the country formally transitioned to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s one-man regime in 2017 that entirely abolished the separation of powers and rendered parliament functionally irrelevant, elections have remained to be held within a legal framework that preserved a veneer of legitimacy.

Now, with İmamoğlu — widely regarded as Erdoğan’s strongest potential challenger in 2028 — being eliminated through judicial means, Turkey has entered a new phase in which elections will be little more than a ritualistic performance. In this sense, the country has now joined the ranks of Belarus, Russia and Venezuela.

For the first time in modern Turkish politics — where multi-party elections have been held since 1946 — a political leader has indicated that he will no longer recognize the legitimacy of elections and the ballot box, asserting that the right to govern will no longer be determined through elections. This move, which will further diminish the opposition’s expectations from the ballot box, symbolizes a setback that paves the way for Turkey to be ruled by a clique clinging to a nostalgic and anachronistic longing for monarchy.

Erdoğan’s vision for Turkey rests on the ideal of a monolithic society, restructured along the lines of political Islam, where all dissent is either crushed or rendered inconsequential. Now, little remains to stand in his way.

The first phase of the Islamist transformation, which has unfolded over two decades, began with the purge of the civilian and military representatives of the Ancien Régime through show trials fabricated on bogus evidence of an alleged coup. This bogus evidence consisted of manipulated digital files, dubious forensic reports and highly suspect secret witness testimonies, many of which were later discredited.

During these trials, the Erdoğan regime framed these bureaucrats and officers as conspirators plotting a coup, systematically dismantling their influence within the state while severely damaging judicial independence. Erdoğan himself played a direct role in shaping the political narrative of these prosecutions, at one point even publicly declaring himself the “prosecutor” of the cases, underscoring the trials’ political motivations rather than any genuine pursuit of justice.

During this period, Erdoğan not only secured the support of certain left-wing and liberal circles in Turkey by portraying himself as a challenger to military tutelage but also gained the backing of Western governments by enacting legal reforms aimed at aligning Turkey with EU democratic norms, successfully framing his struggle against the Ancien Régime as a fight for democracy. 

At this stage, he relied on prosecutors and judges linked to the Fethullah Gülen movement to orchestrate politically motivated trials and, through the 2010 constitutional referendum, ensured that the high judiciary fell under their control. The Gülenists, a secretive Islamist network led by exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen, had infiltrated key state institutions, particularly the judiciary, police and military.

Yet, after consolidating power, Erdoğan turned against the Gülenist network, using the 2013 corruption scandal as a pretext to purge them from state institutions.

The 2013 Gezi protests marked a turning point in Erdoğan’s approach to the opposition. Previously, he had presented himself as a more conciliatory and moderate leader, or at least maintained that appearance in his rhetoric. Gezi began as a small environmental demonstration against the demolition of a park in Istanbul but quickly grew into a nationwide anti-government movement, driven by grievances over authoritarianism, corruption and police brutality.

After Gezi, Erdoğan adopted a deeply polarizing discourse and political strategy, fueling divisions within society and escalating his crackdown on dissent. Following his election as president in 2014, he openly disregarded the constitutional constraints, ruling as a de facto party leader, despite the presidency’s nonpartisan status under the legal framework of the time.

These were critical junctures in Turkey’s political trajectory, but Erdoğan’s most decisive opportunity came with the 2016 coup attempt led by Gülenist officers. In the aftermath of the failed coup, Turkey’s entire public administration was overhauled. Thousands of people, including judges and prosecutors, were arrested, while under the state of emergency, tens of thousands of public servants were dismissed, stripped of their passports and effectively subjected to a form of “civil death.” 

The legal Kurdish political movement, which had opposed Erdoğan’s transition to a presidential system, was also targeted. Selahattin Demirtaş, the movement’s leader, along with numerous Kurdish politicians, was imprisoned — most remain behind bars to this day. The practice of appointing government trustees in place of elected officials — initially introduced to seize Gülenist media outlets — was soon extended to municipalities. Meanwhile, Erdoğan forged an alliance with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party.

During these years, Turkey drifted further away from the Western bloc, purchasing weapons and air defense systems from Russia in alignment with Vladimir Putin’s strategy of creating fractures within NATO.

Following the 2017 referendum that cemented Turkey’s transition to a presidential system, two political figures emerged as major challengers to Erdoğan’s rule, having dealt his party, the AKP, crushing defeats in the 2019 and 2024 local elections: İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş. 

Among the two, İmamoğlu, Istanbul’s mayor, emerged as Erdoğan’s most formidable political rival, distinguished by his powerful oratory, populist charisma and exceptional ability to galvanize mass support. He was widely expected to challenge Erdoğan in the 2028 presidential election and was seen as the most viable candidate to unseat him.

By orchestrating İmamoğlu’s removal from the political stage, Erdoğan has sent an unequivocal message: he will never enter an election he is at risk of losing — just as Russia’s Putin, Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, and Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko have done before him. Up till now, Erdogan could claim he had a majority and therefore a kind of democratic legitimacy. Even though the 2017 referendum was rigged, it was close and he won the elections. Now he has openly ceased to pretend that he has majority support. Not even his supporters believe this.

Erdoğan’s ambitions may not stop at eliminating İmamoğlu. The regime appears poised to launch a broader crackdown on secular journalists, artists and journalists — groups that have, until now, been largely spared from the judiciary’s repressive grip. The Republican People’s Party, now led by İmamoğlu and Özgür Özel, may face systematic marginalization, eventually being reduced to a hollow shell, facilitating Erdoğan’s vision of a monolithic Islamic society.

To understand Erdoğan’s enduring grip on power, it’s crucial to examine the roots of his support. A deep schism in Turkish society has long been apparent, one that Erdoğan has skillfully exploited. He has positioned himself as the champion of the Turkish countryside and the working class, rallying those who perceive themselves as historically marginalized by the entrenched urban elites of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. This populist rhetoric, juxtaposing the “authentic” conservative masses against the secular, Westernized elite, has been a cornerstone of his political strategy.

The durability of his popularity, however, remains a subject of debate. While economic struggles, corruption scandals and the response to natural disasters have chipped away at his approval ratings, his ability to control media narratives and suppress dissent makes it difficult to gauge the true extent of public dissatisfaction.

On the international stage, Erdoğan has proved remarkably adept at maneuvering within the complexities of global politics. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, rather than weakening his position, has arguably bolstered his leverage. Turkey’s role in negotiating the Black Sea Grain Initiative, ensuring the continuation of Ukrainian wheat exports, showcased his ability to position himself as an indispensable geopolitical broker. Additionally, he has sought to present Turkey as a mediator in the conflict, offering to send peacekeepers to Ukraine — a move that further solidifies his image as a leader capable of engaging with both NATO allies and Russia without fully committing to either side.

Today, Turkey under Erdoğan may offer a glimpse into the possible trajectory of political developments in other nations, particularly the United States. The increasing entrenchment of populist authoritarianism, the strategic weaponization of cultural divides, and the consolidation of power through legal and institutional means bear striking resemblances to trends emerging in American politics. If the Turkish experience is any indication, the erosion of democratic norms does not occur overnight but through a series of incremental shifts that, over time, reshape the political landscape entirely.

With global politics increasingly shaped by figures like Putin, U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Europe preoccupied with its internal crises, Erdoğan’s autocratic ambitions face fewer obstacles than ever. Despite the opposition’s efforts to inspire hope, Turkey faces extraordinarily dark days ahead and a new phase in which even the semblance of democratic competition may soon disappear entirely.