Mar 14, 2014
Avoiding Another Cold War
Posted on Feb 17, 2009
By Scott Ritter
But the most serious act carried out by the United States was to formalize the decision to deploy the missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited both nations and signed a formal agreement concerning the establishment of bases for the missile interceptors (in Poland) and associated target acquisition radars (the Czech Republic). Moscow responded by threatening to withdraw from not only the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, which placed limits on the size of the military forces that NATO and Russia were allowed to deploy in a given geographical region, but also the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which had eliminated both intermediate- and short-range nuclear missiles from the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia. The structures that had promoted stability through the reduction of military forces, conventional and nuclear, in Europe were threatening to crumble. The prospects for a new Cold War were very real.
This is the situation that Barack Obama faces when it comes to Russia. Of all the foreign policy problems facing the new president, the Russia issue is by far the most important in terms of U.S. national security, in both the short and long term. Neither the situation in Iraq nor that in Afghanistan possesses the seriousness of a renewal of the Cold War. In the past, the idea of a viable Russian response to NATO expansion was ridiculed by many in the United States, given Russia’s weak economy. But the Russian economy has been bolstered by vast energy supplies. Simply put, the United States cannot afford to reconvene the Cold War, since there is a real chance that it would be the American economy that would fail first. Obama must recognize this simple fact as he struggles to craft an economic recovery plan: The United States cannot afford a new arms race with Russia.
Prime Minister Putin’s insistence that American words needed to be translated into meaningful policy before Russia would act to alter its own policy direction was not just posturing. Even while President Medvedev played down the possibility of a new Cold War with the U.S., noting that Russia and the U.S. “share the same values ... we need only to ensure that these values are understood in the same way,” he ordered the deployment of advanced SS-21 missiles in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, where they would be able to strike the U.S. missile interceptor base in Poland. That these instructions were given shortly after Obama won the election last November was not a coincidence. Clearly Russia is looking to the Obama administration for a break from the policies of the Bush administration, which Medvedev labeled selfish and unilateral.
President Obama appears to be leaning in the direction of promulgating meaningful policy when it comes to Russia. Recently, unnamed administration officials have hinted at a plan to enter into a new strategic arms reduction treaty that would slash the nuclear arsenal of each nation to 1,000. But this has yet to be announced in any official capacity. While Obama has promised to “review” the proposed U.S. missile defense shield in Europe, he has not canceled it. And the new president has not reversed his support for NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, which Obama had articulated in the fall of 2008. There are moves afoot, however, to reintegrate France into all NATO structures, including military, an action that would strengthen the Paris-Berlin hold over NATO. This is a good first step toward establishing NATO more as an instrument of European policy than an extension of American power.
Obama should likewise scrap all talk about the continued expansion of NATO. NATO is not the solution for the problems that exist vis-à-vis Georgia and Ukraine. The United States must continue to demand the full return of all Georgian territory, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, to the control of Tbilisi. However, the best way to make Moscow comfortable with such a move is not to threaten to make Georgia a member of NATO, but rather to de-emphasize NATO as a military organization. NATO is a relic of the Cold War whose time has long since passed. Europe collectively must develop its own mechanisms for political and military security based upon the reality of the present, and not the fiction of the past. NATO was designed to contain the Soviet Union, and in its current manifestation operates to contain Russia.
The real danger from Russia lies not in any genuine expansionistic tendency, but rather its reactions to perceived provocation on the part of the U.S. and NATO. Remove such provocations and Russian aggression against Georgia can be more effectively managed. Failure to do so would only transform the Caucasus region into a new flash point of East-West conflict, the consequences of which could manifest themselves in ways far more terrible than anything that might come out of Baghdad, Kabul or Tehran. For this reason alone, stabilizing and improving relations with Russia must be the No. 1 national security priority of the Obama administration.
New and Improved Comments