May 23, 2013
Mass Protests Are Not a Threat to Putin … Yet
Posted on Dec 12, 2011
By Ivo Mijnssen
The Russian government and Vladimir Putin are confronted with the largest demonstrations in more than a decade. The authorities’ time-proven reaction against protests—repression and the mobilization of loyalists—has proved ineffective. The long-term impact of the protest movement remains unclear, but it has created a new political dynamic in Russia.
Over the past week, Russia has seen the largest anti-government protests since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. On Saturday, protests took place in 70 cities. The largest crowd gathered on Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square, which overflowed. The police put the number of protesters at 25,000, while independent Russian media like the newspaper Kommersant reported about 50,000. Organizers from the opposition group Solidarity said 80,000 were present.
It has been mainly the outrage over the Dec. 4 elections to the Russian parliament, the Duma, that fueled the protests. Widespread election fraud allegations and Putin’s stated goal of returning to the presidency in March have mobilized broad sectors of the population.
In the elections, the governing “party of power,” United Russia, lost almost 15 percent of its seats compared with 2007, and now stands at 49.41 percent of the vote. Nonetheless, it still holds a majority of parliamentary seats.
The United Russia losses represent a big blow to Prime Minister Putin, who needed a positive result in order to bolster his ambitions to return to the presidential chair. Polls taken before the elections had indicated a drop, but Putin’s team counted on winning an absolute majority of the votes to support the claim that, despite imperfections in the electoral system, the prime minister enjoys the support of the majority of Russians and remains the only politician capable of ensuring the well-being of the public and a stable political order in the country. As the vote showed, the government may have underestimated popular discontent over corruption, economic problems and the lack of social mobility for the majority of Russians. Revelations of voter fraud brought this discontent to the surface.
This information emerged even though the websites of oppositional bloggers were down for days before and after the elections. The online editions of the independent news outlets Ekho Moskvy and Kommersant were also inaccessible for extended periods. Even though those responsible for the hacker attacks on these websites remain unknown, most bloggers blame circles close to the government. Critical journalists and bloggers reposted their information on Facebook, Vkontakte (the Russian equivalent of Facebook) and other social websites.
Very rapidly, the protest spread to the streets. On the evening of Dec. 4, between 2,000 and 8,000 people, depending on the source, participated in a largely spontaneous protest. The police cracked down immediately, arresting 300, among them well-known figures like Navalny and Ilya Yashin, an opposition politician. Most of them were sentenced in summary proceedings to 15 days in prison.
In the days that followed, political tension grew in Moscow. Elite units of the Ministry of the Interior were moved into the capital. At the same time, youth organizations loyal to the Kremlin—among them Nashi and the Young Guard—protested in Moscow’s streets. Thousands of young adults arrived in buses from the provinces and, chanting and beating drums, drowned out demonstrations by opponents of the government. They declared that United Russia was the party that “the majority of Russians trusted” and that it had won a “clean victory.”
These groups, and with them Putin, tried to portray the protests as directed from the West. Putin even accused U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton directly, stating that opposition leaders had “heard the signal and with the support of the US state department began active work.”
Such a reaction to popular protests is not new in Russia—it is strongly reminiscent of events of 2005. After the so-called “Orange Revolution” had toppled the Ukrainian government in 2004 in reaction to election fraud, Russian politicians feared that their country might face a similar scenario. The protests that broke out in Russia in 2005, however, were quickly disbanded and oppositional parties were marginalized through changes in the election law and the creation of a loyalist opposition. The political legitimacy of the liberal opposition was undercut through charges that it was an agent of Western secret services.
In 2006, the Putin government made it nearly impossible for Russian nongovernmental organizations to accept funding from abroad, a move widely criticized by international human rights organizations. Furthermore, in order to mobilize more visible support for the government, Kremlin spin doctor Vladislav Surkov helped found a number of loyalist youth movement groups. Organizations like Nashi and the Young Guard of United Russia mobilized tens of thousands of young Russians to take control of Moscow’s streets and to provide future political cadres. Nashi promised its members upward social mobility and participation in a “new elite” that would replace corrupt existing leaders. In reality, however, the movement has consistently supported Vladimir Putin and his political course and barely ever criticizes the government.
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