Dec 11, 2013
Here We WMD Again: Iraq and the Mythical Pakistani Package
Posted on Mar 30, 2010
By Scott Ritter
On March 10, The Washington Post published an article that caught my eye. Under a headline proclaiming “Saddam Hussein weighed nuclear ‘package deal’ in 1990, documents show,” Joby Warrick, the author of the article, declared in his opening paragraph, “As troops massed on his border near the start of the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein weighed the purchase of a $150 million nuclear ‘package’ deal that included not only weapons designs but also production plants and foreign experts to supervise the building of a nuclear bomb, according to documents uncovered by a former U.N. weapons inspector.”
The source of the documents was David Albright, a nonproliferation specialist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a nonprofit organization that Albright himself founded. Albright talked to The Washington Post about these “newly uncovered” documents as part of a publicity campaign for the release of his new book, “Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies.” The Washington Post article was picked up by newspapers and other media outlets around the world, and has been cited by the Pakistani government as one of the reasons behind its recent decision to open a new investigation into the nuclear proliferation dealings of A.Q. Khan, who is also accused of selling nuclear weapons plans and related technology to Iran and Libya.
There is only one problem with The Washington Post story—it isn’t true. The fact is, there never was any such “package deal” worthy of the name, and, in any event, a Pakistani “deal” for a potential nuclear weapon was never “weighed” by Saddam Hussein or any other Iraqi official of note.
When dealing with an issue as controversial and complex as nuclear proliferation, it is essential to stick to the facts. Problems of this difficulty and magnitude must be properly defined prior to offering up a solution, since any solution to a problem that has not been properly defined is no solution at all.
Why worry about a story that is more than 20 years old? Because it continues to drive public perception and influence policy (in Pakistan, we know, and perhaps in other countries as well). One must be cognizant of the role that history plays in shaping present policy, which is why it is so important to get the story right in the first place. When it comes to the issue of nuclear nonproliferation, the stakes could not be higher.
Managing nuclear technology and material, including the matter of access and accountability, is the central problem that must be resolved if universal nuclear disarmament is to be achieved. Nations that possess nuclear weapons need to feel confident enough to agree to their elimination. Public opinion cannot be ignored. The problem of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation is so technical in nature, those who are able to comprehend the nuances involved will do much to establish the parameters of the issue. However, public opinion will determine in large part the political viability of an effort as daunting as global nuclear disarmament. As such, the issue of how information is presented for public consumption is of paramount importance as to whether the public will choose to decide for or against any future policy.
The Iraqi government, after years of denying it was holding on to an archive of material relating to weapons of mass destruction, suddenly led UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors to the Haider farm, where a trove of more than 1 million documents, together with film and some hardware, was stored. The Iraqis declared that Hussein Kamal had been responsible for keeping these materials. Subsequent investigations by UNSCOM and the IAEA, in which I played a central role, cast doubt on the official Iraqi version of events surrounding the provenance of the documents, while confirming the authenticity of the documents and related material. In addition to the 1,000-page file on the Mukhabarat, an optical disc had been provided by Iraq to the IAEA in October 1995. The disc contained a number of technical and administrative documents, as well as a few documents that related to procurement activities.
New and Improved Comments