Kutler is such a good writer, and TruthDig is so valuable a source that both
might consider a bit more restraint before indulging in the annual ritual of
slicing-and-dicing Harry Truman’s decision to nuke one of America’s WWII
enemies into speedy submission and the end of US casualties.  I bring to this
discussion a very common connection to the time of Truman’s superb decision:
My two uncles, Sidney and George were in uniform at the time and would, in all
likelihood, have been part of any invasion—as would thousands of other
American uncles, dads, brothers and sons. Please remember that we as a
nation, were at war with Imperial Japan, an aggressive force that used mass
rape and murder to enforce its will on conquered nations.  They were not the
wonderful, kind, Japanese of today. They were, in fact, ferocious, genocidal,
“Japs.”  If you have forgotten the Rape of Nanking or the various Death Marches
that were emblematic of Imperial Japan’s interaction with the rest of the Pacific
rim until America and its allies stopped them, you might put those phrases into
Google or read an actual book about WWII in the Pacific.  Also, when we are at
war, our first obligation is to win and bring home, alive and well, as many of
OUR soldiers as possible.  The nuking of two ENEMY cities did just that.  Not one
additional Allied life was lost in combat after the two mushroom clouds rose
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki,  And then there is this: One of the single greatest
accomplishments of the modern world was the almost instantaneous (in
historical terms) retooling of Japan from a rampaging, warring,  feudal state
that kept its own women as virtual slaves, into a truly peaceful, modern
democracy with huge opportunities for women. It is almost unimaginable that
this enormous transformation would have been possible had Japan not been so
powerfully shocked into unconditional surrender. For Truman critics who simply
neither understand nor care about the obligation to safeguard our own forces
first, the liberation of Japan from feudalism ought to be enough.  But it won’t
be.  The flagellation of Truman, the arrogant depiction of him as a boob, will
continue into the sunset of time itself.  Such is the nature of ideological
criticism carried out by people who have lost (or never had) any visceral
connection to the realities of the time about which they write.

The Japanese had made some efforts to end the war but were rebuffed by the unconditional surrender demanded by the USA. They wanted assurances the emperor would not be removed and prosecuted which the USA refused to agree to.

Since the USA saw a need to imprison the Japanese population of the USA but made no such effort in the cases of Germans and Italians we can clearly see the prejudice and bigotry advancing the use of the bomb on Japan. There was also a need to show “Uncle Joe” what we might be able to do. Of course Uncle Joe knew we had no more bombs to use on him after the second bomb was dropped in Japan. That is why he finally declared war on Japan after he was sure it would be surrendering in the coming weeks.

Thus we demonstrate the inherent benevolence built into politics when human life is deemed an easily replaceable commodity.

I fail to see how continuation of the conventional bombing campaign (see Tokyo casualties) and a naval blockade meant to starve the country would have resulted in fewer civilian deaths than dropping two A-bombs or brought about a speedy end to the conflict.  The civilian population would have endured this just as they had the bombings and privations leading up to that point.  It’s not like they were clamoring to depose the emperor or give Tojo the boot.  Besides, what’s so magical about one million U.S. casualties.  Had the dropping of the bomb saved the lives of 10,000 American servicemen, it would have been worth it.

I am afraid this is an evasive comment. Please see my Blog: http://balpatil.sulekha.com/blog/post/2009/08/pax-americana-was-hiroshima-necessary.htm
  There was absolutely no military necessity to use the atomic bomb against Japan in August 1945. Japan was, by the Summer of that year, a defeated nation. The only real question was to work out the terms of surrender. But there was a powerful faction which wanted to use the bomb, not to compel the surrender of Japan, but to “shock and awe” the world into submission to an Anglo-American-dominated, one-world government. The untimely death of Franklin Roosevelt on April 12, 1945 gave this grouping the opportunity to succeed with their evil schemes, which they never could have done had Roosevelt been alive.

  The shallow, ill-informed Harry Truman became a dupe of this faction, which operated primarily through his Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. It was these two men who briefed Truman on the bomb project immediately after FDR’s death.

  One of the steps that Stimson and Byrnes subsequently took, was to induce Truman to postpone the Potsdam summit with Stalin until the bomb’s design had been completed and tested. And at Potsdam, the clause offering the Japanese the possibility of establishing “a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty,” was removed from the final Declaration.
  The myth which grew up later—that the use of the atomic bomb saved a million American lives—has no basis whatsoever in reality. The effects of the naval blockade were such that Japan’s raw-materials dependent island economy was virtually shut down, and its military situation was hopeless. Surrender was only a matter of time—within months, November or December at the latest—so long as reasonable terms were offered.
  The following statement of Stimson, the then Secretary of State to the then President Truman published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Feb.3, 1947:
“The future may see a time when such weapon may be constructed secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a wilful nationor group against an unsuspecting nation or or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful and unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very smaller one…”
  Quoting this the most distinguished experimental physicist and Nobel prize winner in 1948 P.M.S. Blackett says in his book The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (1948):  “The obvious result has been to stimulate a hysterical search for 100 per cent security from such attack. since there can be no such complete seccurityfrom such attack. Since there can be no such complete security for America except through world hegemony by America in one form of another…” p.128

Officials and analysts in the United States have been warning that Al-Quaida or associated groups are planning such nuclear attacks on American soil.

  Dubbed as American Hiroshima the plan apparently targets New York, Miami, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Chicago, San Franscisco, Las Vegas, Boston and Washigton D.C..

  Former US Defence Secretary William Perry says there is an even chance of a nuclear attack on the US this decade. Renowned investor Warren Buffet has predicted A nuclear terrorist attack isinevitable.”

‘The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb’, by Gar Alperovitz, is an interesting walk
through some of the documentation, and suggests that Truman ordered it
dropped against the advice of most of his military and civilian advisors. It
suggests that the Japanese were on the verge of surrender anyway, and so was
not necessary. It also suggests that the famous ‘million casualties’ figure for an
invasion of the home islands was pulled out of the air long after the war had
ended.

I have my doubts about how long it would have taken the Japanese to
surrender unconditionally without it, though. Whether they would have lasted
until November 1945, when the U.S. invasion was planned, is impossible to
say, but it was not until after the atom bombing, and the entry of the USSR into
the war, that the emperor finally called a halt. The population was almost
certainly ready to give in, but the Army fanatics on the Supreme War Council,
safe in their bunkers, were not, and there was little the Japanese public would
have been able to do. The USSR, for better or for worse, could have ended up
occupying the entire Korean Peninsula, as well as much of northern Japan.

It’s not so much the dropping of such an untried weapon
on Japan, it’s the selection of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
as legitimate targets that I query.
I also wonder, if this weapon had been developed in
time, whether Berlin would have been targeted,
although, using the same logic used with Japan, I would
think that Cologne and Dresden would have sufficed to
catch the attention of the powers in charge, as
happened in the case of Japan.

Hello Friends

  Read , MEETING AT POTTSDAM,  and you will find out
just why the bomb was dropped. It was never about
saving a million lives, but negotiating with Russia
about the Japanese Surrender,  the Russians wanted to be
in on this.  The Americans did not want Russia any where
near in these negotiations.

  Anyway,  I have been reading Chomsky for close to
thirty years so don’t need to read this but hope you all
have a meaningful discussion, especially on stopping the
next war !!!!!!!!!!!!

I cannot help but observe, but not justify, that it rings true the decision to use the bomb was partly to justify the money spent developing it. But think of the money saved in using it. I have no doubt that the tenacity of the the Japanese army fighting the Americans all the way across the Pacific was a huge factor in invasion planning. Regardless of the devastation the blockade and conventional bombing wreaked on the mainland; economics must have played a part.

It must have entered the minds of the planners that using one or possibly two or even a dozen of these horrific weapons was orders of magnitude less expensive in blood and treasure (on both sides) than a full scale invasion or even continuing the blockade and conventional bombing.

As the targets chosen, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were selected for their geographic features, both being in shallow bowls to maximize the effects of the bombs and as neither target had any military value whatsoever it seems rather clear why the decision was made. We wanted to show Russia how powerful we were, nothing more than that.

Another mystifyingly shallow discussion of Truman’s alternatives, one that does no justice to its title.  Common sense long ago made me ask why they didn’t drop the bomb offshore, or say on Niijima island outside Tokyo Bay?  If that didn’t bring results, it could be argued the Japanese government would have
had to take responsibility for the consequences.  In fact, I read that such a demonstration of the weapon was suggested by several major figures. 

Truman’s reference to an artillery piece is revealing.  He was a decorated officer in WWI and probably used such cannons.  That was soldier-to-soldier.  But the Allies had already descended the slippery slope of civilian slaughter in Tokyo and Dresden and Hamburg. I have come to suspect that we cannot fully grasp
the racial hatred Americans bore the Japanese at this historical moment, or the built-up anger and sense of righetousness traceable back to Pearl Harbor.  Or simply the default murderousness that throbs within people in wartime. 

Why did Bush rush off to ravage Iraq?  It’s a similar dynamic perhaps.  The heat of anger, the male’s rage at an attack on his homeland.  The issue of a million U.S. deaths is a red herring.

When the Americans invaded a few small islands the Japanese women were jumping off the cliffs with their babies. This may have had something to do with the decision to drop the bomb. The Japanese make a big play about Hiroshima but 700m from my house is the apex point of where 10x the number died (Sumida River) and there’s not one single plaque or even flimsy notice. The bomb allowed the Japanese an “out” from mass destruction. Many Japanese I know acknowledge that fact gratefully.