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In the Clinton-Yeltsin era, the new Russian state, more virtual than real, presiding over a collapsed economy and a massive social crisis, was preoccupied with its own survival and incapable of, or even interested in, pursuing any coherent and active foreign policy. The Democratic administration in Washington saw management of U.S.-Russian relations as its No.1 foreign policy concern because it viewed Russia’s post-communist crisis as a source of major threats to U.S. and global security. In the 1990s, the U.S. was deeply involved in designing and implementing Russia’s transition to capitalism, and in order to create a safer environment for that transition, Washington ostensibly treated Russia as an equal, agreeing to establish a strategic partnership. A key condition of that partnership, even if not spelled out officially, was Russia’s willingness to follow America’s lead. It was in the framework of that partnership that START-I and START-II treaties were signed by both sides, providing for deep cuts in the strategic offensive arsenals of the two sides. This progress in arms control reflected the liberal internationalist worldview of the Clinton administration, which believed that U.S. interests would be better served by significant progress in nuclear arms control. As far as Russia was concerned, it needed deep reductions both because it could not afford the Soviet-era capabilities and because its new leadership, accepting the basics of the liberal internationalist outlook, did not need those capabilities.

In 2000, governments were changed in both capitals, and U.S.-Russian relations entered a new stage.

In its first months in office, the George W. Bush administration treated Russia as a basket case of botched transition and a failing state. Engagement with Russia and adherence to parity with it were now viewed as redundant baggage from the liberal  ‘90s. The neoconservative shift in U.S. foreign policy produced a different attitude to nuclear arms control: Existing treaties were now seen as hangovers from the Cold War era—and as unnecessary constraints on the exercise of global power by the United States.

The events of Sept. 11, 2001, served as a trigger for full-scale enactment of the neoconservative program: the declaration of war on international terrorism and “the axis of evil,” the assertion of U.S. military superiority, the doctrine of preemptive war, the weaponization of space, etc. There was no place in this program for measures to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, for meaningful reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, or for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Russia, like every other country, now faced an ultimatum: Support the new U.S. war or fall into the category of an enemy.

By declaring early and unqualified support for the U.S., President Putin secured some political capital with Washington. The Bush administration’s original dismissive attitude to Russia gave way to a new appreciation of Russia’s value as a possible ally in the “war on terror.”  The resulting positive impulse in U.S.-Russian relations made it possible for the two sides to sign the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2002. But the treaty reflected the ambivalent nature of the new stage in U.S.-Russian relations. On the one hand, it confirmed the principle of parity and a commitment to further reduction of offensive nuclear arsenals. On the other hand, it seemed almost a sideshow to the more important things going on in U.S. foreign policy. Glaring weaknesses in the treaty’s provisions, coupled with Washington’s decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty, reflected the new U.S. interest in nuclear weapons as key tools of global hegemony, with arms control serving as political cover for the drive for nuclear primacy.

As the weaker power of the two, Russia has little to gain from the dismantlement of arms control structures—and Moscow has so far remained committed to their preservation and strengthening. But it takes two to tango, and Moscow began to modify its posture to take account of the new U.S. approach. In their new relationship, in which they cooperated on terrorism but were increasingly at odds on major issues of East European and Eurasian geopolitics and security, the two countries, one confidently, the other reluctantly, nearly abandoned their traditional joint role of the chief custodians of global arms control.

Instead, each of the two went about its own way. As the Bush administration pushed for full U.S. military dominance, Russia took it as a direct challenge to its security; in response, it increased its reliance on nuclear arms. The effectiveness of Russian nuclear deterrent became a matter of debate. In a highly controversial article published in Foreign Affairs in early 2006, two American analysts, Kier A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, argued that the U.S. is on the verge of acquiring an ability to fight and win a major nuclear war. They wrote, “Today, for the first time in almost 50 years, the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy. It will probably soon be possible for the United States to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike. This dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power stems from a series of improvements in the United States’ nuclear systems, the precipitous decline of Russia’s arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China’s nuclear forces. Unless Washington’s policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase the size and readiness of their forces, Russia and China—and the rest of the world—will live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come.” (See Foreign Affairs, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press. See also discussion in Foreign Affairs, “Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?” Peter C. W. Flory, Keith Payne, Pavel Podvig, Alexei Arbatov, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press.)  In other words, Gorbachev and Reagan were wrong, and we are freer in the new century than we were in the last one: American nuclear primacy will assure that nuclear war can be won and just might be fought, if the need arises.